Last year, five people hoping to view the Titanic wreckage died when their submersible imploded in the Atlantic Ocean. A Coast Guard panel that’s investigating the Titan submersible disaster heard two weeks of testimony that ended Friday. Previous witnesses provided testimony that raised serious questions about whether warning signs were ignored.

Here’s what witnesses have been saying so far:

The Marine Board of Investigation concluded two weeks of testimony Friday with a moment of silence for the five victims who perished on the submersible Titan. The chair said more work needs to be done before a final list of recommendations is submitted to the leadership of the Coast Guard.

The final day brought some dramatic moments, including when a former OceanGate employee testified company co-founder Stockton Rush brushed aside worries about the U.S. Coast Guard. Rush said that “if the Coast Guard became a problem, then he would buy himself a congressman and make it go away,” according to Matthew McCoy, who resigned after the interaction.

Also Friday, Capt. Jamie Frederick, commander of the Coast Guard sector based in Boston, appeared to be stunned to learn that the captain of Titan’s support vessel felt, in hindsight, there was a slight shudder around the time the submersible imploded on its way to the wreckage of the Titanic last year.

Frederick said it was “unconscionable that they wouldn’t share that” in real time, and said it could’ve “changed the equation” in terms of the Coast Guard rescue response.

NASA and Boeing officials on Thursday described what they called their limited roles in the creation of the doomed submersible Titan even though the co-founder of OceanGate previously touted ties to NASA and aerospace manufacturers.

Justin Jackson, a materials engineer, said NASA was unable to fulfill a role in building and testing the carbon fiber hull because of the COVID-19 pandemic. He said NASA officials were uncomfortable with being linked to the experimental submersible, saying “our folks had some heartburn” when OceanGate suggested NASA’s endorsement.

Boeing was involved in an early feasibility study of the use of carbon fiber for Titan’s hull and in OceanGate’s acoustic sensors on the hull before the relationship ended. Mark Negley, material and process engineer at Boeing, said OceanGate ultimately departed from some of its recommendations on the pressure hull.

A key employee with the company that owned the experimental submersible that imploded pushed back at a question from a Coast Guard investigator focusing on whether OceanGate felt a sense of “desperation” to complete the dives because of the high price tag.

Amber Bay, director of administration for OceanGate, insisted Tuesday that the company would not “conduct dives that would be risky just to meet a need.” That said, told the Coast Guard panel, “There definitely was an urgency to deliver on what we had offered and a dedication and perseverance towards that goal.”

She also referred to clients as “mission specialists” and “explorers,” not passengers. She tearfully noted that she knew all of them. “There’s not a day that passes that I don’t think of them, their families and the loss, she testified through tears.

The co-founder of the company that owned the experimental submersible that imploded en route to the wreckage of the Titanic told a Coast Guard panel Monday that he hopes the tragedy yields a renewed interest in exploration.

“This can’t be the end of deep ocean exploration,” said businessman Guillermo Sohnlein, who helped found OceanGate with Stockton Rush. He said the company was started with a laudable goal: “We wanted to give humanity greater access to the ocean, specifically the deep ocean,” Sohnlein said.

Roy Thomas of the American Bureau of Shipping testified about challenges associated with carbon fiber, which was the material used for the pressure hull of the doomed Titan submersible. He noted that carbon fiber is difficult to manufacture and salt water can damage and weaken the material in multiple ways.

He said there’s no recognized standard for a submersible carbon fiber pressure hull for human occupancy and that carbon fiber is “susceptible to fatigue failure under repeated external pressurization.”

When testifying about a dive that took place several years before the fatal accident, lead engineer Tony Nissen said he felt pressured to get the Titan ready and he refused to pilot it.

“I’m not getting in it,” Nissen said he told Rush. Nissen said Rush was difficult to work for, made demands that often changed day-to-day, and was focused on costs and schedules. Nissen said he tried to keep his clashes with Rush hidden so others in the company wouldn’t be aware of the friction.

Scientific director Steven Ross said that on a dive just a few days before the Titan imploded, the vessel had a problem with its ballast, which keeps vessels stable. The issue caused passengers to “tumble about” and crash into the bulkhead, he said.

“One passenger was hanging upside down. The other two managed to wedge themselves into the bow,” Ross testified.

He said nobody was injured but it took an hour to get the vessel out of the water. He said he didn’t know if a safety assessment or hull inspection was carried out after the incident.

A paid passenger on a 2021 mission to the Titanic said the journey was aborted when the vessel started experiencing mechanical problems.

“We realized that all it could do was spin around in circles, making right turns,” said Fred Hagen. “At this juncture, we obviously weren’t going to be able to navigate to the Titanic.”

He said the Titan resurfaced and the mission was scrapped. Hagen said he was aware of the risks involved in the dive.

“Anyone that wanted to go was either delusional if they didn’t think that it was dangerous, or they were embracing the risk,” he said.

Operations director David Lochridge said the tragedy could possibly have been prevented if a federal agency had investigated the concerns he raised with them on multiple occasions.

Lochridge said that eight months after he filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a caseworker told him the agency had not begun investigating and there were still 11 cases ahead of his. By that time, OceanGate was suing Lochridge and he had filed a countersuit. A couple of months later, Lochridge said, he decided to walk away from the complaint. He said the case was closed and both lawsuits were dropped.

“The whole idea behind the company was to make money,” Lochridge testified. “There was very little in the way of science.”

After Lochridge’s testimony this week, the federal agency responded that, at the time, it had “promptly referred” his safety concerns to the Coast Guard.

Renata Rojas, a member of the Explorers Club which lost two paid passengers in the fatal dive, struck a different tone with her testimony. She said she felt OceanGate was transparent in the run-up to the dive and she never felt the operation was unsafe. A passenger on a previous dive, Rojas was volunteering with the surface crew when the Titan imploded.

“Some of those people are very hardworking individuals that were just trying to make dreams come true,” she said.

Source: wral.com